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Abstract 
We build a dataset of harmonized rotating panel labor force surveys covering 
42 countries across a wide range of development and document three new empiri-
cal findings on labor market dynamics. First, labor market flows (job-finding rates, 
employment-exit rates, and job-to-job transition rates) are two to three times higher 
in the poorest as compared with the richest countries. Second, employment hazards 
in poorer countries decline more sharply with tenure; much of their high turnover 
can be attributed to high separation rates among workers with low tenure. Third, 
wage-tenure profiles are much steeper in poorer countries, despite the fact that wage-
experience profiles are flatter. We show that these facts are consistent with theories 
with endogenous separation, particularly job ladder and learning models. We dis-
aggregate our results and investigate possible driving forces that may explain why 
separation operates differently in rich and poor countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Several recent strands of development economics have converged on poorly functioning 
labor markets as possible contributors to poverty. In the macro-development literature, the 
concern is that labor market distortions or barriers may cause workers to be misallocated 
across regions, industries, or firms, lowering gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.1 A 
growing experimental literature has evaluated treatments that alter the search behavior of 
workers and firms, with the idea that they may improve outcomes such as match quality.2 
Finally, in the development policy literature, there is a belief that poor countries need to 
“remedy the institutional failures and market imperfections that prevent the private sector 
from creating more of those good jobs for development.”3 
Despite this widespread interest, there is as yet no consensus on which frictions are more 
severe in poor country labor markets. The search and matching literature offers a number 
of theories with candidate frictions, but we lack systematic empirical evidence to evaluate 
which is the most promising. While recent work has developed estimates of important cross-
sectional objects such as hours worked or the unemployment rate, the main limitation is 
that little is known about labor market dynamics in poor countries (Bick et al., 2018; Feng 
et al., 2018). 
Our first contribution is to provide systematic evidence on how labor market dynamics 
vary with development. We start by building a new dataset consisting of the microdata from 
rotating panel labor force surveys from 42 countries.4 The countries span a broad range of 
development, with purchasing power parity (PPP-) adjusted GDP per capita ranging from 
less than $5,000 (Nicaragua, Palestine, Philippines) to more than $30,000 (United States, 
much of Europe). We use the rotating panel structure to match people’s responses over 
time, yielding 67 million observations of people matched across two consecutive quarters. 
The original microdata are rich and typically include information on labor force sta-
tus, demographics, education, employer, and job. We harmonize the data to make them 
comparable across countries. We take particular care in harmonizing labor force status, 
which is used to construct empirical counterparts of key concepts such as job seekers and 
1See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) for an introduction to the literature and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), 
Gollin et al. (2014), and Young (2013) for papers that propose and evaluate misallocation of this type. 
2For example, Abebe et al. (2019) directly subsidize transportation costs for workers who search; Abel 
et al. (forthcoming) provide workers with reference letters; and several researchers certify workers’ skills 
(Carranza et al., 2019; Abebe et al., 2019; Bassi and Nansamba, 2019). See also McKenzie (2017) for a 
review of the literature and other related work. 
3World Bank (2013, p. 35). 
4We also use this dataset to study the cyclical properties of labor markets across countries (Donovan et 
al., 2019). 
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the job-finding rate. Countries do not define labor force status consistently, so we re-
construct a harmonized labor force status by applying a common definition to the original 
survey responses. We also implement a simplified version of the analysis of Flinn and Heck-
man (1983) to show that unemployment, inactivity, and self-employment are less distinct 
in poorer countries, even given consistent definitions. In light of this finding, we discuss 
several ways to map the model to the data. 
We use this dataset to document three novel facts about how labor market dynamics 
vary with development. First, labor market flows (job-finding rates, employment-exit rates, 
and job-to-job transition rates) systematically decline with development, with the poorest 
countries in our sample having transition rates two to three times higher than the richest. 
This decline is strongest for the employment-exit rate but also sizable for the job-finding 
rate and the job-to-job transition rate. 
Second, while in all countries the employment hazard function is declining with tenure, 
it declines much more rapidly in poorer countries. Much of the higher employment-exit rate 
and job-to-job transition rate in poorer countries can be attributed to very high turnover 
among the many workers with low tenure levels; by contrast, in any country, workers with 
several years’ tenure are unlikely to separate from their job. This result mirrors recent 
findings on the decline of short job spells and labor market turnover over time in the 
United States (Mercan, 2017; Pries and Rogerson, 2019). 
Finally, we document that the wage-tenure profile is steeper in poorer countries, despite 
the fact that we re-confirm the literature’s finding that the wage-experience profile is flat-
ter in poorer countries (Lagakos et al., 2018). This third fact is useful for discriminating 
among potential theories. It is well known that there are two possible underlying deter-
minants of wage-tenure profiles (Topel, 1991). First, they may reflect returns to tenure – 
for example, through the accumulation of job-specific human capital. However, this seems 
unlikely to generate our cross-country patterns: it is hard to explain why workers in poor 
countries accumulate job-specific human capital more rapidly yet are more likely to exit 
from (apparently valuable) matches. Alternatively, wage-tenure profiles also reflect non-
random selection of workers or matches into longer tenure spells. Motivated by this second 
hypothesis, we view selection via endogenous separation as the most promising mechanism 
for explaining and interpreting our empirical findings. 
The search and matching literature provides two broad candidate theories. We present 
simplified versions of each and use them to highlight channels that can generate our results. 
In the learning model of Jovanovic (1979), workers and firms receive only a noisy ex ante 
signal of match quality; additional information is learned ex post through production. A 
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less informative ex ante signal leads workers and firms to sample more marginal matches, 
generating both higher job-finding and employment-exit rates. More bad matches imply 
more ex post selection, which generates steeper hazard functions and tenure-wage profiles. 
In the job ladder model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), workers can receive outside 
offers from other possible employers. A worse initial match or more rapid arrival rate of 
outside offers leads to more frequent acceptances of outside offers, generating both higher 
job-finding and separation rates. Both forces generate more ex post selection in terms of 
which matches survive to high tenure levels and so steeper hazard functions and wage-tenure 
profiles. 
These models show how selection via endogenous separation provides a mechanism for 
understanding our findings. They also suggest some driving forces that may explain cross-
country variation in labor market dynamics, including the amount that can learned about 
match quality ex ante, the arrival rate of outside offers, and workers’ outside options. These 
forces are not directly observable. It is possible that there are universal differences across 
countries in, for example, the amount that can be learned about match quality. However, 
it is also possible that our aggregated results hide underlying compositional differences. 
For example, Arcidiacono et al. (2010) document that firms are better informed about 
more educated workers’ ability in the United States, which suggests that low educational 
attainment in poor countries may be a promising driving force. To study this in more 
detail, we connect our results to observable characteristics of workers and firms. 
We start by disaggregating our results to see whether observable characteristics explain 
selection. We find that several observable characteristics can help account for our findings 
but that the basic patterns hold also within narrowly defined groups. We further consider 
the importance of labor market institutions, motivated by a large literature that shows they 
are important for understanding patterns among rich countries (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 
1998; Krause and Uhlig, 2012; Jung and Kuhn, 2014; Engbom, 2017). Again, we find that 
some labor market institutions correlate with our patterns, but controlling for institutions 
does not overturn the relationship between dynamics and development. We also document 
that many of our patterns hold when comparing poor and rich regions within several coun-
tries. We therefore conclude with a discussion of remaining possibilities, highlighting areas 
where other approaches in the literature are informative as well as those where more data 
and work are needed. 
There are two important caveats to our database and the types of results we can provide. 
First, the poorest countries, including most of sub-Saharan Africa, generally do not collect 
rotating panel labor force surveys. Thus, our benchmark results do not cover such countries, 
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although we consider some evidence from alternative sources. Second, about one-fourth of 
our samples cover only urban areas. We choose to focus only on urban areas for our 
benchmark results, although if anything our results appear to be stronger in rural areas. 
Additional data sources on the poorest countries, which are primarily rural, would be 
valuable, particularly given evidence that some labor market patterns diverge in these 
countries (Bick et al., 2018; Feng et al., 2018). 
In addition to the work cited so far, our paper is closely related to a small literature that 
considers search and matching models outside the context of rich countries.5 Three recent 
papers have extended the search and matching framework to allow for self-employment or 
informal employment, which we also find to be an important part of cross-country differ-
ences (Albrecht et al., 2009; Poschke, 2019; Bobba et al., 2018). Martellini and Menzio 
(2019) provide a model that accounts for the long-run (non-)trends in job-finding rates in 
the United States in the face of large presumed gains in matching efficiency. Finally, Rud 
and Trapeznikova (2018) provide the only other facts on labor market dynamics in poorer 
countries by looking at flows between self-employment and wage work using lower-frequency 
data (spanning six months to three years) for six sub-Saharan African countries. To inter-
pret their findings, they develop a dual-economy model with labor market frictions. One 
goal of our work is to provide a set of systematic facts and outline candidate models that 
may be useful for expanding this type of analysis. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our work 
on harmonization and comparability. Section 3 provides the three new facts about labor 
market dynamics and development. Section 4 describes two candidate theories from the 
literature that rationalize our facts. Section 5 explores possible underlying driving forces. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2 Data Description and Harmonization 
The empirical results of this paper build on a new harmonized dataset constructed from the 
microdata of the rotating panel labor force surveys of 42 countries around the world. Our 
goal was for our dataset to be as comprehensive as possible. We identified the official labor 
force survey for all countries, meaning the survey used to generate officially reported labor 
force indicators, such as the unemployment rate. Many countries use or have used a rotating 
panel design, which includes households for multiple periods. We read documentation 
5See Rogerson et al. (2005) for a review of the broader body of search and matching theory or Elsby et 
al. (2013) for recent cross-country work on flows among (relatively developed) OECD countries. 
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files and searched the literature to identify as many such countries as possible, including 
countries that have subsequently abandoned the rotating panel design. 
We restrict our attention to the subset of countries with rotating panel labor force 
surveys that satisfy two criteria. First, we require that the country provide the original 
microdata with consistent identifiers so that we can match respondents over time. This 
restriction rules out countries that treat the microdata as confidential or that release only 
anonymized versions without household or individual identifiers. Second, we require that 
the data allow us to match people for two consecutive quarters. This restriction allows 
us to focus on using the largest possible comparable subset of surveys, including many 
countries where households are followed for only two consecutive quarters as well as some 
more complicated designs.6 Our final dataset contains microdata from 42 countries. The 
European Union Labour Force Survey includes 17 countries with usable identifiers. Labor 
force surveys for the remaining countries are individually collected. See Appendix A.1 for 
further details as well as details on countries with rotating panel labor force surveys that 
we could not use. 
2.1 Matching and Re-Weighting 
Each observation in our dataset is an individual matched across two consecutive quarters. 
We match individuals in one of two ways. In most countries, we have unique and consistent 
household and person identifiers. In these countries, we use the pair of identifiers to match 
individuals over time. We validate the resulting matches by checking that each is unique 
and that the responses for age and gender are consistent across quarters, in line with 
standard practice (Madrian and Lefgren, 2000). The share of matches that fail these tests 
is generally low. In a few countries, we have household but not consistent person identifiers. 
For these countries, we match on household identifier, age, sex, and education. We keep 
only observations with unique, exact matches on these three variables. 
All of our countries sample dwellings (physical addresses) and interview whoever inhab-
its those dwellings at the appropriate times. Thus, households that move dwellings between 
quarters cannot be matched. This fact has the potential to bias our estimates to the extent 
that moving (or other forms of non-response) is correlated with outcomes of interest such as 
finding a job. We follow the literature’s typical approach of adjusting the provided sample 
weights so that the matched and unmatched samples have similar observable characteristics 
(Bleakley et al., 1999; Fujita and Ramey, 2009). We focus on education, labor force status, 
6For example, some European countries include households for six consecutive months; the United States 
includes households for two four-month spells. Each allows us to create a quarterly (three-month) match. 
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Table 1: Sample Overview 
Country Years Obs. (thousands) GDP p.c. range 
Albania 2012 - 2013 37 10,400 - 10,500 
Argentina 2003 - 2019 794 13,400 - 19,800 
Bolivia 2015 - 2018 247 6,400 - 7,000 
Brazil 2002 - 2019 8,260 11,600 - 15,500 
Chile 2010 - 2019 2,084 19,400 - 22,900 
Costa Rica 2010 - 2019 393 12,900 - 15,700 
Croatia 2007 - 2018 73 20,300 - 23,600 
Cyprus 2005 - 2018 202 29,900 - 36,000 
Czech Republic 2005 - 2010 532 25,800 - 29,400 
Denmark 2007 - 2018 228 43,400 - 47,700 
Dominican Republic 2016 - 2017 52 14,500 - 15,000 
Ecuador 2007 - 2019 325 8,800 - 10,900 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2008 - 2012 205 9,500 - 10,000 
Estonia 2005 - 2018 70 22,200 - 31,000 
France 2003 - 2017 3,070 35,300 - 39,000 
Georgia 2009 - 2016 141 6,500 - 9,300 
Greece 2010 - 2018 864 23,700 - 28,700 
Guyana 2017 - 2018 9 7,400 - 7,600 
Hungary 2005 - 2018 1,363 22,200 - 28,200 
Iceland 2005 - 2018 50 40,100 - 48,600 
India 2017 - 2018 190 6,500 - 6,900 
Ireland 2007 - 2018 665 42,900 - 70,400 
Italy 2005 - 2018 1,669 33,900 - 38,600 
Latvia 2007 - 2018 71 18,300 - 26,400 
Lithuania 2005 - 2018 178 18,500 - 31,100 
Malta 2009 - 2018 47 27,500 - 38,100 
Mexico 1995 - 2019 17,253 13,500 - 18,100 
Nicaragua 2009 - 2012 194 3,900 - 4,400 
Palestine 2000 - 2015 558 2,800 - 4,600 
Paraguay 2010 - 2017 45 9,700 - 11,800 
Peru 2003 - 2018 248 6,900 - 12,800 
Philippines 1988 - 2003 1,989 3,800 - 4,400 
Poland 2005 - 2018 709 17,200 - 28,800 
Romania 2005 - 2018 775 14,400 - 24,500 
Slovak Republic 2005 - 2018 525 20,000 - 31,300 
Slovenia 2010 - 2018 107 27,600 - 32,700 
South Africa 2008 - 2018 1,228 11,800 - 12,400 
Spain 2000 - 2018 6,858 30,000 - 35,100 
Sweden 2005 - 2018 1,389 40,900 - 47,200 
Switzerland 2010 - 2017 373 55,900 - 58,000 
United Kingdom 1997 - 2017 3,591 30,300 - 39,900 
United States 1979 - 2019 9,130 36,300 - 55,700 
Total: 
42 countries 515 country-years 66,791 2,800 - 70,400 
a Table notes: Range of PPP GDP per capita World Bank (2019), rounded to 
the nearest $100. An observation is an individual surveyed in two consecutive 
quarters. 
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age, and gender as the most important dimensions. See Appendix A.3 for details. The ad-
justed weights are generally similar to the provided weights, measured using the correlation 
between the two (Table A4) or the fact that standard moments are fairly similar regardless 
of which weight is used (Figure A1). 
We de-seasonalize the quarterly data and aggregate to the country-year level; for the 
rest of the paper, we treat a country-year as an observation. We focus throughout on the 
urban population aged 16–65. Our main results of interest are even stronger when we focus 
on the three-quarters of samples that include both urban and rural areas; see Appendix 
A.5.7 We focus on workers aged 16–65 to mitigate concerns about cross-country differences 
in labor market institutions such as child labor laws or retirement policies. In addition, 
some countries collect very limited data on people over age 65. 
Table 1 identifies the countries that are covered and basic summary information. Alto-
gether, we have about 67 million observations spanning 515 country-years. The duration 
of data availability varies widely, ranging from six quarters of the newly formed Guyana 
Labour Force Survey to 41 years in the United States. We merge our data with annual 
PPP GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators when discussing development 
trends (World Bank, 2019). Our countries cover a wide range of development, although wee 
lack data on the very poorest countries, where the cost of such panel surveys is generally 
prohibitive. We can infer dynamics from retrospective questions on employment history for 
a few such countries but are not able to form reliable estimates of the patterns there; see 
Appendix C for further details. 
2.2 Comparing Labor Force Status across Countries 
An essential ingredient of our paper is comparing labor force statuses and rates of transition 
between labor force statuses across countries. We take two steps to ensure that these 
comparisons are meaningful. First, we re-construct labor force status, using a standardized 
definition applied to the original microdata for all countries and years. This step is necessary 
because the provided labor force status variable is constructed using a definition that varies 
somewhat across countries and time.8 
We first categorize people as employed or not employed. Formally, the employed are 
those who are engaged in the production of goods and services that fall inside the production 
7See also Jeong (2019) for RCT-level evidence of frictional labor markets in rural Tanzanian village 
economies. 
8Hussmanns (2007) reviews the ideal definitions and some of the conceptual and practical issues that 
arise and lead countries to deviate. The most important deviation is that many countries do not require 
workers to meet the “search” criteria to be counted as unemployed. 
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boundary as defined by the System of National Accounts (Hussmanns, 2007). They include 
those who work for someone else (wage and salary workers) and the self-employed, which in 
turn includes employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers. We follow the 
United States’ convention of requiring at least 15 hours of unpaid family work to be counted 
as employed, in order to minimize concern that we might artificially inflate “flows” between 
employment and non-employment among such workers in poor countries. Most surveys in 
poorer countries include a battery of questions designed to ensure that they capture people 
who are engaged in self-employment inside the production boundary. For example, it is 
typical to have separate questions about whether the respondent raises crops or livestock 
for his or her own consumption, operates a small business, or produces small handcrafts, 
rather than a single question asking whether he or she is self-employed. 
Those who are not employed are categorized either as unemployed or inactive (out of 
the labor force). We define unemployment consistently as people who are not employed but 
who satisfy the standard three-part test: i) they want a job; ii) they have actively searched 
for a job in the last four weeks; and iii) they are available to start a job.9 People who fail 
any of these three questions are labeled inactive. 
The first step ensures that labor force status is consistently defined across countries. The 
second step considers the mapping between data and theory in the cross-country context. 
The heart of the search and matching literature is the matching function, which governs 
the number of matches formed as a function of the number of job seekers and vacancies. 
The convention in most work that takes this function to the data is to equate job seekers 
with the unemployed, at least as a first pass.10 This mapping may not be appropriate in 
our context, which includes much poorer countries. 
Two specific concerns have received attention in the literature. First, the search criterion 
for unemployment may be less salient in poorer countries, where workers may either know or 
easily be able to learn about the relevant set of job opportunities without much active search 
(Hussmanns, 2007). In this case, some people whom our methodology classifies as inactive 
may actually be job seekers. Second, recent work has suggested that self-employment in 
poor countries acts in part as a substitute for missing unemployment insurance, allowing 
workers to earn some income while searching for better work (Albrecht et al., 2009; Schoar, 
2010; Poschke, 2013, 2019). Both these concerns motivate us to re-examine who should be 
included in the set of job seekers. 
9The exact search period varies slightly but is generally four weeks, 30 days, or a month. India is the 
only outlier; it asks about search over the last week. 
10There are exceptions; Elsby et al. (2015) show that cyclical variation in labor market outcomes such 
as the unemployment rate is affected by movements in and out of the labor force. 
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We conduct a test of whether unemployment and inactivity are distinct, in the spirit 
of Flinn and Heckman (1983). They propose that the two statuses are distinct to the 
extent that they have different job-finding hazards. Conversely, if people who have been 
unemployed or inactive for the same length of time are equally likely to find work, then there 
is no meaningful behavioral difference between the two statuses. Although our data do not 
allow us to construct the entire job-finding hazard, we can construct the relative quarterly 
job-finding rates. In Figure 1a we plot the relative job-finding rate of the unemployed as 
compared to the inactive against GDP per capita. 
Figure 1: Inactivity and Development 
(a) Relative Job-Finding Rate (Unemployed/Inactive) 
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(b) Flows to Employment (c) Share of Inactive Who Are Marginally Attached 
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This figure adopts the common format we use throughout the paper, so some explanation 
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is in order. First, we always plot outcomes of interest against PPP GDP per capita. Each 
observation is the average for a country-year constructed as discussed above. We also 
compute and plot the cross-year average for each country, which we label with three-digit 
country codes. Given the clustering by country, this label often helps distinguish within-
country patterns from those between countries. Finally, we include in all scatter plots a 
best-fit line of a regression of the data points against log PPP GDP per capita. 
Figure 1a shows two main results. The unemployed are more likely than the inactive to 
move to employment in all countries and years. However, there is a strong positive trend 
with development. In the poorest countries, the unemployed are only twice as likely to find 
a job; in the richest countries, the proportion grows to a factor of around 4–12. 
We use the microdata to investigate why so many workers in poor countries transition 
between inactivity and employment. Figure 1b unpacks the job-finding rate of inactive 
workers coded based on self-reported reason for not seeking work. We code workers who 
report being unable to find suitable work (wrong skills, too young or old, no work currently 
available, etc.) as marginally attached, while those who are unable to work or uninterested 
in work (sick, disabled, in school, retired, caring for the household or family) are coded 
as no attachment.11 As expected, in all countries, the marginally attached are more likely 
to move to employment. However, the correlation of job-finding rates with development 
is weak for each of the groups. Figure 1c shows that large cross-country variation in the 
fraction of people who are marginally attached to the labor force accounts for much of our 
findings. While as much as 75 percent of the inactive in poor countries are marginally 
attached to the labor force, a much lower share of workers in rich countries are. These 
results indicate that unemployment and inactivity are less distinct in poor countries. 
We conduct a similar analysis for the self-employed. In this case, we compare the rates 
of transition to wage work from unemployment versus self-employment. The results are 
shown in Figure 2. In most rich countries, the ratio is high, meaning that it is relatively 
rare for the self-employed to transition to wage work. On the other hand, the self-employed 
are only half as likely as the unemployed to find wage work in poorer countries. This result 
is consistent with the cross-country literature that asks workers why they are self-employed. 
The finding there is that the self-employed in poorer countries are less likely to report that 
they had an idea for a business or wanted to be their own boss and more likely to report 
that they could not find other work (Schoar, 2010; Poschke, 2013). 
These findings suggest that the set of job seekers is broader than the pool of unemployed 
11For a subset of countries, we can utilize instead a direct question about whether the respondent “wants 
to work”; similar results apply. 
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Figure 2: Relative Wage-Work Finding Rate (Unemployed/Self-Employed) 
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people in poorer countries. Our baseline approach for the remainder of the paper is to 
pool workers into employed and non-employed and to study flows between them: the job-
finding rate and the employment-exit rate. Doing so acknowledges that unemployment 
and inactivity are less distinct in poorer countries. It also alleviates the most important 
form of classification error, which results when workers misreport their labor force status. 
Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Poterba and Summers (1986) draw on re-interview surveys 
from the Current Population Survey to document that by far the most common problem 
is misclassification between unemployment and inactivity. By aggregating the two, we 
eliminate the concern that we are imputing spurious labor market transitions and hence 
inflating estimates of labor market flows. Following on our second results, we keep track 
of two different types of transitions within employment: between wage jobs (the job-to-job 
transition rate) and from self-employment to wage work. 
2.3 Basic Cross-Sectional Facts 
Given these conventions, it is useful for context to check cross-sectional facts about the 
stocks of workers. Figure 3 plots against GDP per capita the employment-to-population 
ratio and self-employment as a share of total employment. We find an upward trend for 
the employment-to-population ratio. This is in line with results from Bick et al. (2018) 
after conditioning on similar countries (we are missing the very poorest countries, which 
they find have higher ratios). The self-employment share is strongly negative correlated 
with development, with self-employment accounting for half of employment in our poorest 
countries, in line with existing work (Gollin, 2008). 
11 
Figure 3: Cross-Sectional Labor Force Facts 
(a) Employment-to-Population Ratio (b) Self-Employment as a Share of Employment 
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3 Labor Market Dynamics and Development 
In this section, we document three new findings about how labor market dynamics vary 
with development. We show that flows are higher in poorer countries; high turnover in poor 
countries is concentrated among workers with low tenure levels; and wage-tenure profiles 
are steeper in poorer countries even though wage-experience profiles are flatter. We discuss 
theories of these findings in Section 4, and in Section 5, we use the microdata to disaggregate 
them and look for possible driving forces. 
3.1 Labor Market Flows 
We start by documenting how four labor market flows vary with development. We use 
reported changes in labor force status to measure three of the four labor market flows. The 
job-finding rate is constructed as the share of initially non-employed workers who transition 
to employment in the subsequent quarter.12 The employment-exit rate is constructed as the 
share of initially employed workers who transition to non-employment in the subsequent 
quarter. We also construct as one form of job transition the share of initially self-employed 
workers who transition to wage work. 
The fourth labor market flow – the job-to-job transition rate among wage workers – 
is measured differently, using reported tenure on the job. For the set of countries where 
12We generally do not observe and abstract from workers who have transitions within the quarter. Stan-
dard corrections to produce the implied hazards assume that hazard rates are constant over the intervening 
quarter and hence do not affect the relative trends by development that we focus on (Shimer, 2012). 
12 
short tenure spells are reported in weeks or months, we define the job-to-job transition rate 
as the share of initially employed wage workers who remain employed at wage work with 
tenure less than three months in the subsequent quarter.13 Tenure is available only for wage 
workers, and we use it to define only the wage job to wage job transition rate, which we 
simply call the job-to-job transition rate. 
Figure 4: Quarterly Transition Rates 
(a) Employment-Exit Rate (b) Job-Finding Rate 
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(c) Job-to-Job Transition Rate (Wage Work) (d) Self-Employment to Wage Job Transition Rate 
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Figure 4 plots the transition rates against development. The main finding is that all 
four transition rates decline with development. The effect is economically significant, with 
transition rates two to three times higher in the poorest as compared with the richest 
13The U.S. CPS data are an outlier. We use the dependent coding available since 1994 to classify job-
to-job transitions as workers who work for wages in months 1 and 4, but report changing employer during 
months 2–4, following Fallick and Fleischman (2004). 
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countries. Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for the regressions underlying the trend 
lines in Figure 4. All of the point estimates are negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The reported R2s confirm the visual impression that the fit is tightest 
for the employment-exit rate. 
Table 2: Labor Market Flows and Development 
Panel A: All countries Exit Rate JFR S.E. - Wage Job-Job 
Log GDP per capita -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.033*** -0.012*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 486 486 486 409 
R-squared 0.460 0.029 0.173 0.061 
Sample Average 0.057 0.120 0.071 0.040 
Panel B: Rich countries Exit Rate JFR S.E. - Wage Job-Job 
Log GDP per capita 0.019*** 0.105*** 0.015 0.034*** 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.009) (0.003) 
Observations 286 286 286 271 
R-squared 0.098 0.207 0.009 0.366 
Sample Average 0.035 0.098 0.044 0.030 
Table Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘S.E. - Wage” are all flows from self-employment to 
wage work. “Job-Job” is all wage work to new wage work jobs. 
Our findings are somewhat at odds with the conventional wisdom in the existing litera-
ture on cross-country comparisons of labor market flows. That literature focuses primarily 
on developed countries. Within this set of countries, the typical finding is that richer coun-
tries have higher transition rates: the United States, United Kingdom, and northern Europe 
have higher transition rates than central and southern Europe. This finding applies also 
in our sample. Panel B of Table 2 provides the regression estimates from a sample that 
includes only EU countries, Switzerland, the U.K., and the United States. For this sample, 
we also find a positive relationship between labor market flows and development. These 
countries span a fairly narrow range of development, suggesting caution is required when 
attempting to extrapolate trends related to development from analyses conducted among 
rich countries. 
These results hold for our preferred approach of aggregating employment and non-
employment. However, we show in Appendix B.1 that similar findings apply for alternative 
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approaches. Intuitively, this is because each of the four original labor force statuses is 
more persistent in richer countries (Figure B1) and most of the possible flows among these 
statuses are less frequent in richer countries (Figure B2). Hence, we find also that flows are 
negatively correlated with development if we take the conventional approach of equating 
job seekers with the unemployed and disregarding the inactive, if we include the marginally 
attached but not the non-marginally attached inactive workers in the pool of job seekers, or 
if we include the self-employed in the pool of job seekers. We conclude that the finding that 
flows are negatively correlated with development is robust. This finding by itself invites 
many possible explanations. We now provide two additional facts on cross-country labor 
market dynamics that can help discriminate among explanations. 
3.2 Employment Hazard Functions 
Our second fact involves the cross-country comparison of employment hazard functions. 
We find that much of the correlation between labor market flows and development is driven 
by high hazard rates for workers with low levels of job tenure. In essentially all countries, 
exit rates are low for workers with high levels of job tenure. This finding is consistent with 
recent work that documents that much of the decline in turnover over time in the United 
States is accounted for by a reduction in very short employment spells (Mercan, 2017; Pries 
and Rogerson, 2019). 
To show this point, in all countries for which we have the data, we construct as a 
function of initial tenure the probability that a worker transitions to non-employment or 
to a new job. Tenure is available only for wage workers, so the facts in this and the next 
subsection apply only to this population. We group wage workers into four tenure bins for 
visual clarity: those on the job for less than six months, six to twelve months, one to five 
years, and five years or more. 
Figure 5a shows the results for transitions to non-employment, and Figure 5b shows 
the results for job-to-job transitions. In both cases, there is an important role for tenure. 
There is a strong trend in exit rates and job-to-job transition rates for workers who have 
been on the job for less than a year. By contrast, there is essentially no trend for workers 
who have five or more years of tenure; such workers in any country are unlikely to switch 
jobs or exit employment. 
These results are quantitatively significant. If we counterfactually endow all countries 
with the world average distribution of tenure duration for wage workers, then the estimated 
effect of development on employment-exit rates and job-to-job transition rates falls by 36– 
40 percent. This figure turns out to be much larger than any other observable characteristic 
15 
Figure 5: Transition Rates by Job Tenure 
(a) Transition to Non-Employment (b) Transition to New Job 
ARG
BRA
CHE
CHL
CRI
CYP
CZE
DNK
DOM
ESP
EST
FRA
GBR
GRC
GUY
HUN
IRLISL
ITL
LTU
LVA
MEX
MLT
PERPRY
ROU
SVK
SVN
SWEUSA
WBG
ZAF
ARGBRA
CHECHL
CRI
CYPCZE DNKDOM
ESP
EST FRAGBRGRC
GUY
HUN IRLISLITLLTU
LVA
MEX
MLTPER
PRY
ROU SVK
SVN
SWE
USA
WBG
ZAF
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
4000 8000 16000 32000 64000
GDP per capita
0-6 months 6-12 months 1-5 years 5+ yearsTenure:   
ALB
ARG
BRA
CHE
CHL
CRI
CYP
CZE
DNK
DOM
ESPEST
FRA
GBR
GRC
GUY
HUN
IRL
ISL
ITL
LTU
LVA
MEX
MLT
PER
PRY
ROU
SVK
SVN
SWE
USAWBG
ZAF
ALB ARGBRA CHECHLCRI CYPCZE
DNKDOM ESPEST FRAGBRGRC
GUY
HUN IRLISLITLLTULVA
MEX
MLT
PER
PRY
ROU SVKSVN WE
USA
WBG ZAF0
.1
.2
.3
.4
4000 8000 16000 32000 64000
GDP per capita
0-6 months 6-12 months 1-5 years 5+ yearsTenure:   
we explore, as we will show in Section 5.1. Of course, tenure is an endogenous feature of the 
match. However, these results suggest that theories of flows that prioritize a meaningful 
role for tenure are likely to be useful. In the next section, we provide a third fact that 
further supports this view. 
3.3 Wage-Tenure Profiles 
Our last fact concerns cross-country variation in the shape of the wage-tenure profile. To 
estimate this, we use reported labor earnings to construct an hourly wage. The original 
questions vary somewhat by country, but this is most commonly constructed by dividing 
monthly labor earnings by 4.33 times the hours worked in the reference week. Since our 
interest in tenure leads us to focus anyway on wage workers, we disregard some cases where 
we have reported income for the self-employed. 
We estimate an augmented Mincer wage equation motivated by Topel (1991) and La-
gakos et al. (2018). We pool all available years for a country and regress: 
log(wit) = α + φx + ξτ + ρedu + γt + εit. (1) 
wit is the hourly wage of individual i observed at time t. The vector φx consists of dummies 
for potential experience groups {2–4 years, 5–9 years, 10–19 years, 20+ years}, with 0–1 
years of potential experience serving as the omitted reference group. Potential experience 
is constructed as age minus expected years of schooling minus six. The vector ξτ consists of 
16 
dummies for tenure group {6–12 months, 1–5 years, 5+ years}, with 0–6 months of tenure 
serving as the omitted reference group. The vector ρedu is a set of dummies for education 
(harmonized to the categories of Barro and Lee (2013)), and γt is a vector of year dummies. 
εit is a mean-zero error term. 
We start with the wage-experience profile. Previous work has that it is flatter in poorer 
countries (Lagakos et al., 2018). Figure 6 plots against PPP GDP per capita the estimated 
percentage wage difference between workers with 10–19 or 20 or more years of experience, 
each compared to workers with 0–1 years of experience. We obtain the same result as 
previous work: the returns to experience rise with development. This finding holds inde-
pendently of whether we control for tenure. 
Figure 6: Wage-Experience Profiles 
(a) Wage Difference, 10–19 Years Experience (b) Wage Difference, 20+ Years Experience 
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We now turn to the estimated wage-tenure profiles shown in Figure 7. We plot against 
PPP GDP per capita the estimated percentage wage difference between workers with 6–12 
months or 1–5 years of tenure, each compared to workers with less than six months of 
tenure. The striking finding is that wage differences for highly tenured workers are higher 
in poorer countries, implying that the wage-tenure profile is steeper. 14 
It is well known that there are two determinants of wage-tenure profiles (Topel, 1991). 
They reflect the accumulation of job-specific human capital. However, this factor seems 
unlikely to generate our cross-country patterns: it is hard to explain why workers in poor 
countries accumulate job-specific human capital more rapidly yet are more likely to exit 
14In the Appendix, we provide various alternative bins for tenure, along with different controls in the 
regression. The results are robust. 
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Figure 7: Wage-Tenure Profiles 
(a) Wage Difference, 6–12 Months of Tenure (b) Wage Difference, 1–5 Years of Tenure 
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from (apparently valuable) matches and have flatter wage-experience profiles. Wage-tenure 
profiles also reflect the selection of which workers or matches survive to longer tenure 
spells. This factor offers a more promising explanation of our cross-country patterns: it 
requires that workers with high job tenure in poor countries be more selected on wages or 
productivity, which seems plausible in light of the finding that hazard rates are much higher 
at low levels of job tenure in poor countries. In the next section, we outline two theories 
from the literature that formalize this mechanism. 
4 Theory 
Two classes of search and matching theories feature endogenous separation and hence se-
lection of which matches survive to high levels of tenure. Each is capable of generating 
our three key facts: higher flows, steeper tenure hazards, and steeper tenure-wage profiles 
in poorer countries. In learning models, workers and firms are imperfectly informed about 
match productivity but learn more by producing (Jovanovic, 1979, 1984; Menzio and Shi, 
2011). If they learn that a match is unproductive, they endogenously (jointly) choose to 
separate. In job ladder models, workers receive outside employment offers (Burdett and 
Mortensen, 1998). Attractive offers induce workers to quit their current job and move. 
The key insight from these models is that endogenous selection of high-productivity or 
high-wage matches to longer tenures is an avenue for understanding our findings.15 
15By contrast, the textbook search and matching model has little to say about tenure (Pissarides, 1985). 
Nonetheless, in Appendix E we analyze that model for completeness. It can generate patterns consistent 
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4.1 Learning 
Our version of the learning model draws on Menzio and Shi (2011), although the predictions 
of interest also hold in the original model of Jovanovic (1979). We consider a match between 
an unemployed person and a vacancy generated by the standard matching function. Upon 
meeting, the pair draw a match-specific productivity x from distribution F (x) that has 
mean µ. However, they do not necessarily know this productivity. Instead, the worker 
and the firm draw a signal s that is equal to x with probability p and is an independent 
draw from F with probability 1 − p. In the limit case p = 1, matches are said to be 
inspection goods, whose quality can be perfectly determined in advance. In the limit case 
p = 0, matches are said to be experience goods, whose quality can be learned only through 
production. 
The worker and the firm are both risk neutral, and they have outside options b and 0, 
respectively. They first decide whether to engage in production. If they do so, they produce 
x. We assume that they produce if joint expected surplus exceeds the combined outside 
option b. Each period of production reveals true match quality with probability λ. Matches 
that are revealed to have negative surplus (x < b) are endogenously destroyed. Matches 
are also exogenously destroyed with probability δ. 
This simple model makes predictions about labor market flows, employment hazards, 
and wage-tenure profiles. We derive each in turn. 
Labor Market Flows First, the model allows for the possibility that some matches (with 
sufficiently low match-quality signals) endogenously do not produce, which in turn affects 
the job-finding rate. In the model, the share of matches that generate expected surplus 
above the outside option and so lead to production is given by   
b − (1 − p)µ
1 − F . (2) 
p 
If we assume that µ > b (the average match generates surplus exceeding the outside option), 
then the share of matches that lead to production and thus the job-finding rate is decreasing 
in both b and p. For example, a share 1 − F (b) of matches leads to production in the 
inspection-good case, but all matches lead to production in the experience-good case. 
The model also generates predictions about the employment-exit rate. Define the share 
of matches that engage in production despite having (unobserved) match productivity below 
with our findings on labor market flows only if we allow for cross-country variation in unobserved parameters 
(the cost of posting a vacancy or the productivity of the matching function). 
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the reservation level as    
b − (1 − p)µ
ν ≡ (1 − p)F (b) + p F (b) − F . 
p 
The two terms capture type-1 and type-2 errors, respectively: the probability of using an 
inaccurate signal from a bad match, plus the probability of failing to reject a marginally 
bad match because of signal imprecision. 
This is the share of matches that will be endogenously destroyed after receiving the λ 
shock. It varies with p and b, which implies that the model can generate variation in the 
employment-exit rate. The share is decreasing in p; it ranges from F (b) in the experience-
good case to 0 in the inspection-good case. 
Employment Hazard The model generates a hazard function given by 
dτ = δ + (1 − λ)τ −1λν. (3) 
The function is strictly declining in tenure if λ > 0 and p < 1. The model can generate 
variation in the shape of the hazard function either through the arrival of the learning shock 
λ or through ν, which in turn depends on p and b. 
Wage-Tenure Profile Finally, the model generates a wage-tenure profile. To derive 
this prediction, we need to specify a wage-setting rule, taking care to ensure that it is 
consistent with our assumption that all matches with expected match quality above b lead 
to production. One analytically convenient wage rule that satisfies this property is to 
assume that workers and firms equally split the surplus in each period. Surplus depends 
on match quality if it is known and expected match quality if not. Then, average wages for 
matches with known and unknown quality are given by 
E(x|x > b) b 
w k = − 
2 2h   i 
b−(1−p)µpE x|x > + (1 − p)µ
pu b w = − . 
2 2 
Note that wk ≥ wu unless matches are inspection goods, in which case match quality is 
known ex ante and wages never change. 
With this notation, we can characterize the wage-tenure profile. The average log-wage 
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of workers with tenure τ relative to new workers with no tenure is given by  
k 
 
w 
log(wτ ) − log(w0) = log (1 − λ)τ + (1 − (1 − λ)τ ) . (4) 
wu 
The wage-tenure profile is increasing and concave if 0 < λ < 1 and p < 1, but it is again 
flat for the inspection-good case. The wage-tenure profile is steeper if p is lower. 
Cross-Country Implications The learning model can help understand cross-country 
differences in labor market dynamics if learning and ex post selection are correlated with 
development. For example, it can account for our findings if p is higher in richer countries, 
meaning that rich countries are closer to the inspection-good case and poor countries closer 
to the experience-good case. Along the same lines, it can account for our findings if λ 
is higher in poor countries. Finally, it accounts for several of the findings if b is lower 
in poorer countries, because this induces workers and firms to engage in more marginal 
matches, which are more likely to be revealed to be unproductive.In Section 5, we consider 
evidence for these hypotheses in the data and the literature. First, we show that similar 
predictions arise in a job ladder model. 
4.2 Job Ladder 
Our job ladder model draws on Ridder and van den Berg (2003). We assume that there 
are two discrete types of jobs: low-wage jobs and high-wage jobs, paying wL < wH , re-
spectively.16 The supply of vacancies of each type is exogenous and fixed, with π denoting 
the share of low-wage vacancies. The non-employed have an outside option b drawn from a 
distribution with cdf B and support [b, b] satisfying b ≤ wL ≤ b < wH . 
Non-employed people who match with a vacancy decide whether to accept the exogenous 
wage offer. After production in each period, matches are subject to two shocks. First, they 
can be exogenously destroyed with probability δ. Second, workers can receive outside 
offers. These offers generate endogenous separation in a manner similar to learning in the 
previous model, so we use the notation λ to denote the probability of receiving an outside 
offer to emphasize the commonality. Workers who receive an offer from a higher-paying job 
switch. Workers who receive an offer from a job that pays the same as their existing job are 
indifferent and are assumed to remain with their current employer. Given this simple setup, 
16Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show how to get wage heterogeneity in equilibrium even with ex ante 
identical firms and workers. Ridder and van den Berg (2003) get similar results in a model with a continuum 
of exogenous firm types; we focus on two types for simplicity. 
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workers switch jobs if they can ascend one rung up the job ladder, from the low-paying to 
the high-paying job. 
This simple model also makes predictions about labor market flows, employment haz-
ards, and wage-tenure profiles, which we again derive. 
Labor Market Flows First, the model again allows for the possibility that some matches 
(between low-wage firms and high-opportunity cost workers) do not lead to production, 
which affects the job finding rate. This share of matches is given by πB(wL)+1 − π, which 
is increasing in the share of workers with low outside options, B(wL). 
The model also generates predictions about the job-to-job transition rate, which depends 
on the rate at which outside offers are received λ and the share of workers with low-wage 
jobs in equilibrium. In steady state, the share of matches with tenure τ that pay low wages 
is given by 
[1 − λ(1 − π)]τ 
` τ = . 1−π λ(1−π)(1−δ)[1 − λ(1 − π)]τ + +
πB(wL) 1−(1−δ)[1−λ(1−π)] 
The numerator captures the mass of low-wage matches that have not received a high-wage 
outside offer.17 It varies with parameters such as offer arrival rate and the share of workers 
with low outside options. 
Employment Hazard Second, this model again generates a declining hazard function. 
The probability that a match is destroyed after achieving tenure τ is given by 
dτ = δ + ` τ λ(1 − π). 
This probability is strictly declining in tenure if λ > 0 and 0 < π < 1. The initial level 
depends on the rate of arrival of outside offers and the initial share of workers in low-wage 
jobs, which in turn depends on outside options through B(wL). 
As with the learning model, these results reflect selection via endogenous separation. 
The unemployed initially match with both low-wage and high-wage jobs. As tenure in-
creases and outside offers accumulate, a growing share of the workers who initially worked 
low-wage jobs will have received a high-wage outside offer. Hence, increasing tenure implies 
a growing share of workers with high-wage jobs. 
17The two extra terms in the denominator capture the mass of workers who initially matched with a 
high-wage job and remain at tenure τ as well as the share of workers who ascended the job ladder to a 
high-wage job and achieved tenure τ . 
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Tenure-Wage Profile This selection process once again has implications for the wage-
tenure profile. We again characterize the log-wages of a worker with tenure τ relative to a 
new worker:   
` τ wL + (1 − ` τ )wH
log(wτ ) − log(w0) = log ,
` 0wL + (1 − ` 0)wH 
which is positive and concave if λ > 0 and 0 < π < 1. 
Cross-Country Implications The job ladder model can help understand cross-country 
differences in labor market dynamics if the rate at which workers climb the ladder is corre-
lated with development. For example, it can account for our findings if λ is higher in poorer 
countries, meaning that workers are more likely to receive outside offers there. It can also 
account for our findings if workers in poorer countries have worse outside options (higher 
B(wL)), which in effect starts them on a lower rung of the job ladder and gives them more 
room to climb. 
4.3 Summary 
We have shown that two theories in the search and matching literature can rationalize our 
findings. Both emphasize endogenous selection of matches to generate declining employ-
ment hazards and rising wage-tenure profiles. They also provide possible driving forces that 
may explain why this mechanism works differently in poor countries. Within the simple 
theories considered so far, those mechanisms include the precision of ex ante information 
about match quality, the rate at which match quality is learned, the rate at which workers 
receive outside offers, and the quality of workers’ outside options. 
Of course, we cannot directly observe these forces. This leaves two broad possibilities. 
The first is that there is indeed some technological difference across countries that makes 
it more difficult to, for example, screen workers in poorer countries. The second is that 
the difference in “average” screening difficulty is driven by underlying compositional differ-
ences in workers or firms or differences in (observable) labor market policies. For example, 
while we cannot measure directly the precision of ex ante information about match quality, 
Arcidiacono et al. (2010) documents that in the United States, firms are better informed 
about more-educated workers’ ability. This suggests disaggregating our cross-country re-
sults to see whether they vary systematically by education and whether the composition of 
the labor force by education can account for our results. Likewise, while we cannot measure 
workers’ outside options, we have measures of labor market institutions that affect those 
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outside options. 
To study these questions, we therefore use a combination of disaggregated results and 
measures of labor market institutions. We then return to the direct forces emphasized in 
the theories presented here, highlighting related results from the literature and areas where 
additional data and analysis are needed. 
5 Evidence on Driving Forces 
In this section, we explore possible driving forces that might explain our new empirical 
facts. We disaggregate our results to study the importance of composition effects. We link 
them to available measures of labor market institutions and study within-country variation. 
Finally, we discuss related findings from the literature and avenues where additional data 
are needed. 
5.1 Disaggregated Results and Composition Effects 
Our first approach is to disaggregate our results by worker and firm characteristics. Doing 
so allows us to understand how labor market dynamics vary within and between groups, 
with a focus on whether they are accounted for by composition effects. The standard 
disclaimer about accounting methods applies: they capture only proximate differences and 
cannot capture any possible spillovers or general equilibrium effects. 
We return to our microdata and harmonize widely available characteristics of workers 
and firms. Not all variables are available in all countries or years; Table A3 provides details 
on availability. For workers, we harmonize age in 10-year bins (16–25, 26–35, and so on). 
Gender is available for all countries. We code education into a binary variable for whether 
a worker has completed high school. More detailed classifications can be constructed for 
subsets of countries but yield similar results. We harmonize occupations at the one- and 
two-digit level, following the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 
08 standards. Most countries directly use ISCO occupational schemes or adapt their own 
schemes from the ISCO, which makes harmonization somewhat easier. 
For firms, we categorize industry using an industry coding scheme with 15 possible codes 
suggested by Minnesota Population Center (2019). We measure establishment size using 
three bins: small (1–9 employees), medium (10–50 employees), and large (51+ employees) 
establishments. Most surveys were careful to distinguish establishment from firm, but 
in some poorer countries, the distinction was not so clearly made. The rarity of multi-
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establishment firms in poor countries makes this less important. Finally, in many countries, 
we know whether the firm employs the worker on a formal basis, where a formal job is one 
where the employer makes payments into social programs (such as pensions) on the worker’s 
behalf. 
We disaggregate employment shares and employment-exit rates along each of these 
dimensions. Figure 8 shows the disaggregated results by education, motivated by the work 
of Arcidiacono et al. (2010) discussed in the previous section. Figure 8a plots the share of 
workers with less than a high school degree. It varies widely, from one-half in the poorest 
countries to about one-tenth in the richest. Figure 8b disaggregates the employment-
exit rate by education. Educated workers are less likely to exit employment essentially 
everywhere, with an average gap of 2–3 percentage points in quarterly exit rates. 
Figure 8: Accounting for Education 
(a) Employment Share, <HS (b) Exit Rate by Education 
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Figures with disaggregated results for other characteristics are available in Appendix D. 
We find several other characteristics with large between-group variation in exit rates and 
cross-country variation in employment composition. These characteristics include age, oc-
cupation, establishment size, and formal status. These findings raise the question of whether 
our aggregate trends can be explained by systematic variation in labor force composition 
by development. 
We use an accounting exercise to address this question. Recall that our benchmark 
estimate of the trend relationship between labor market flows and development in Table 2 
is derived from a simple regression: 
Tct = α + β log(yct) + εct. 
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We construct counterfactual labor market flows that fix at a common level the composition 
of workers or firms, isolating only the variation in flows by type. If we decompose the 
overall transition rate Tct into the transition rate by group g ∈ G, Tgct and the share of 
group g in the relevant population ωgct, then our counterfactual transition rate is X 
T˜  ct = ω¯ gTgct, 
g∈G 
where ω¯ g is the average share for group g in our cross-country sample. 
We estimate the relationship between this counterfactual flow and development: 
T˜  ct = α˜ + β˜  log(yct) + ε˜ct. 
We say that accounting for group G is important if it substantially attenuates the estimated 
relationship between flows and development. Formally, we say that group G accounts for 
β˜ 
share = 1 − 
β 
of the overall flows-development trend. 
Table 3 summarizes our accounting results for employment-exit rates.18 The columns 
give the results for total employment or for wage workers alone. The main reason for 
studying wage employment is that the self-employed in most countries do not provide 
information on their industry, occupation, or formal status, so we can account for these 
characteristics only for wage workers. 
We start with Panel A, which considers each factor in isolation. As expected, several of 
the observed characteristics help account for the flows-development trend. The education 
findings shown in Figure 8 account for 19 percent; age, occupation, establishment size, and 
formal status account also for non-negligible shares. However, our findings hold even within 
disaggregated categories. The easiest way to see this is that no single factor accounts for 
even one-fifth of the overall flows-development trend. 
Panel B of Table 3 considers interactions of factors and their ability to account for 
the trend in labor market flows. Broadly, the findings are consistent with a small role 
for observable characteristics. Two factors account for, at most, one-third; accounting 
18We focus on the employment-exit rate because in this case, ω¯ g is the sample average share of group g 
matches, which is always observed. By contrast, accounting for the job-finding and job-to-job transition 
rates for firm characteristics requires us to fix the sample average share of group g vacancies, which is not 
observed. In Appendix D, we present accounting results for worker characteristics and the other flows. 
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Table 3: Accounting for Employment-Exit Rates 
Share Accounted for (%) 
Panel A: One Factor Wage Employment Total Employment 
Sex -0.042 -0.096 
Sector 0.023 – 
Firm Size 0.110 0.213 
Informal 0.120 – 
Occupation 0.140 – 
Age 0.155 0.079 
Edu 0.188 0.195 
Panel B: Multiple Factors 
Occupation + Firm Size 0.223 – 
Firm Size + Age 0.242 0.291 
Occupation + Sector 0.250 – 
Occupation + Age 0.282 – 
Occupation + Edu 0.324 – 
Age + Sex + Edu 0.267 0.157 
Occupation + Age + Edu + Firm Size 0.493 – 
Table notes: All figures capture the share of the exit rate-development relationship accounted 
for by the worker or firm characteristics given in the rows. The share accounted for is 
constructed as explained in the text. Columns give the corresponding figure for total 
employment or wage employment; “–” indicates that the figure cannot be computed. 
for interactions of three or four terms can push the figure up to, at most, one-half. We 
conclude that although disaggregating our results and allowing for composition effects can 
help explain our findings, at least half remains unaccounted for. 
5.2 Labor Market Institutions 
An existing literature cites the importance of labor market institutions – the set of reg-
ulations, rules, and norms that affect employment relations in a country – for explaining 
cross-country differences in labor market dynamics among rich countries (Ljungqvist and 
Sargent, 1998; Krause and Uhlig, 2012; Jung and Kuhn, 2014; Engbom, 2017). In the con-
text of our models, labor market institutions are likely to affect separation rates (through 
employment protection laws) and workers’ outside options (through minimum wages). We 
consider two forms of evidence on the importance of labor market institutions. 
We start by conducting accounting exercises using the measures of cross-country labor 
market institutions available from the World Bank’s Doing Business survey. The index 
measures the institutions governing a fixed benchmark case: the employment of a cashier 
at a supermarket in the retail sector. The data are available from 2014 to 2018, although 
the exact indicators available vary by year. 
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We investigate the relationship between labor market flows and development after con-
trolling for labor market institutions using the regression 
Tct = β log(yct) + ψzct + γt + εct, (5) 
where Tct is a measure of flows in country c in year t, yct is GDP per capita, and zct is 
one of the various measures provided of labor market regulations and institutions. We also 
include year fixed effects γt. Our main question of interest is whether controlling for labor 
market institutions substantially attenuates the estimate of β. 
Table 4 shows the results. We focus here on the employment-exit rate, but results 
for the job-finding rate are similar and can be found in Appendix D. The first column 
confirms that the exit rate declines with income. We then proceed to introduce various 
labor market indicators. We control for the extent of severance pay requirements; paid 
leave requirements; the existence of labor courts for resolving labor disputes; the legal 
status of fixed-term contracts; the minimum wage, expressed as a ratio of value added per 
worker; and the duration of a probationary period for new workers. Finally, in column (8) 
we use principal component analysis to extract the common factor among all the measures 
of institutions. 
Table 4: Employment-Exit Rates and Labor Market Institutions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log GDP per capita -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.022*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
Severace pay (weeks of salary) 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Annual paid leave required (days of work) -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
Existence of labor court 0.017** 
(0.007) 
Legal to have fixed-term contracts -0.002 
for permanent work? (0.005) 
Min Wage/VA per worker 0.014 
(0.014) 
Probationary period (months) 0.000** 
(0.000) 
1st principal component 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Observations 139 139 139 87 139 110 129 51 
R-squared 0.450 0.508 0.542 0.433 0.450 0.466 0.525 0.627 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sample Average 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.046 
Coeff, GDP per capita (no institutions) -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.041*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
R-squared (no institutions) 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.398 0.450 0.461 0.505 0.487 
Table notes: All regulations are taken from the World Bank Doing Business survey. Severance and annual 
paid leave are measured as inverse hyperbolic sines, to approximate a log specification while allowing zeros. 
The row labeled “coeff, GDP per capita (no institutions)” is the coefficient from the regression of exit on 
log GDP per capita in the restricted sample without including any labor market indicators. “R2 (no 
institutions)” is the associated R2 . 
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These results show that labor market institutions affect employment-exit rates, con-
sistent with the existing literature. Many of the relationships are economically and sta-
tistically significant. However, the negative relationship between labor market flows and 
development remains after controlling for labor market institutions. Even in the most ex-
treme case (controlling for the bundle of labor market institutions produced by principal 
component analysis) the estimate is cut by less than half. The estimates in the appendix 
show that the negative relationship between the job-finding rate and development often 
strengthens after controlling for labor market institutions. 
Intuitively, labor market institutions do not explain our findings because they are only 
weakly correlated with development. While many European Union countries have restrictive 
labor market institutions, so do Egypt, Palestine, and South Africa; on the other hand, 
while many poorer countries have less stringent institutions, so do the United States and 
the United Kingdom. 
This first approach relies on evidence from cross-country regressions. As a second, 
complementary approach, we explore whether the relationship between labor market flows 
and development holds also across regions within a country, where differences in labor 
market institutions and other possible confounding factors are presumably smaller. 
We focus on three countries with consistently defined regions, large regional income 
variation, and a large number of observations per region: India, Mexico, and the United 
States. For each, we re-compute transition rates by region (state, including administrative 
regions in India) and year. We merge this data with annual regional real GDP per capita.19 
In each case, GDP is adjusted for inflation but not for cross-regional price disparities; we 
are not aware of systematic regional accounts that include such a correction. 
For each country, we pool regions and years and regress transition rates on log GDP per 
capita. Table 5 shows the results. The estimates are negative and statistically significant 
for five of the six possible cases; only the job-finding rate in India shows a positive (but 
statistically insignificant) trend. The magnitudes also compare well with the aggregate 
cross-country evidence in Panel A of Figure 2. The effect of income on the exit rate is about 
one-third of the cross-country estimate (-0.035), while the effect of income on the job-finding 
rate is quite similar (-0.017). This evidence suggests again that labor market institutions 
19United States: per capita real GDP from the regional accounts, avail-
able at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm. Mexico: 2013 fixed 
price GDP from https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/pibent/2013/default.html# 
Tabulados divided by population from https://datos.gob.mx/busca/dataset/ 
proyecciones-de-la-poblacion-de-mexico-y-de-las-entidades-federativas-2016-2050/ 
resource/c3a55508-2678-4018-bf5b-bf1f45745ae7. India: per capita net state domestic product 
from http://mospi.nic.in/data. 
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Table 5: Labor Market Flows and Income Across Regions 
USA 
Exit Rate JFR 
Mexico 
Exit Rate JFR 
India 
Exit Rate JFR 
Log GDP p.c. -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
-0.023*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Sample Average 
1,982 
0.075 
0.055 
1,982 
0.011 
0.162 
741 
0.133 
0.104 
741 
0.143 
0.186 
66 
0.047 
0.052 
66 
0.003 
0.038 
Table Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
represent a plausible channel for cross-country variation in labor market dynamics but that 
they are unlikely to account for all of the differences. 
5.3 Evidence from the Literature and Areas for Future Work 
Our database is useful because it yields systematic evidence on labor market dynamics for a 
large number of workers and a wide range of countries. However, the underlying microdata 
consist of surveys of workers, which limits the types of data they contain and the types 
of hypotheses we can directly address. The goal of this section is to consider the evidence 
from alternative approaches used in the literature. 
For example, a growing experimental literature has considered the role of limited ex ante 
information in labor market matches. This approach has the benefit of being able not only 
to isolate information but also potentially to disentangle who is missing the information.20 
Recent work has tested such issues and finds an important role for signaling worker skills to 
firms (Bassi and Nansamba, 2019; Abebe et al., 2019). The effects of such an intervention 
are larger when certificates are provided to firms in addition to workers, suggesting that 
joint information about match quality is important for these effects (Carranza et al., 2019). 
More broadly, limited ex ante information is consistent with the findings that referrals and 
reference letters are important mechanisms for filling vacancies and finding jobs in devel-
oping countries (Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Abel et al., forthcoming). The combination 
of our cross-country results and these well-identified micro studies across multiple coun-
tries suggests that the learning model presented in Section 4 is a promising benchmark for 
studying equilibrium labor market policies. 
One limitation we face is that labor force surveys typically ask questions only about the 
search activity of people who are classified as unemployed, while our results suggest that the 
20Recall the learning theory in Section 4 relies on match-specific information. In practice, this could 
come from workers being uninformed about the firm, firms being uninformed about workers, or both. 
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search behavior of the employed and the inactive would also be of interest. Banerjee and 
Bucci (1995) document that in urban India, on-the-job search activity declines significantly 
with tenure, consistent with what one would expect in job ladder models. They show also 
that the self-employed and informally employed are more likely to engage in such search 
than wage workers, especially public-sector wage workers, which is consistent with recent 
work that models self-employment in poor countries as being a mixture of a substitute for 
missing unemployment insurance and search (Schoar, 2010; Poschke, 2013, 2019). It would 
be useful to more broadly incorporate these types of questions. 
Finally, our microdata contain limited information on employers. This limitation makes 
it difficult to address hypotheses that attribute the driving forces to employer character-
istics. For example, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) document a negative correlation between 
aggregate economic volatility and development. If aggregate economic volatility generates 
firm-level employment volatility, it could help explain our findings.21 The limited employer 
data available in labor force surveys do not allow us to directly address this hypothesis. 
We highlight these results to show that despite the undertaking to collect our data, 
more work is clearly required on these topics. In addition to the RCT evidence above, a 
promising channel is the growing use of matched employer-employee databases, as Cornwell 
et al. (2019), Engbom and Moser (2018), and Morchio and Moser (2019) utilize to study 
various aspects of the Brazilian labor market. Moreover, the results highlight the clear 
complementarity between cross-country studies of labor market outcomes and more detailed 
studies of individual labor markets in building a body of evidence on the functioning of labor 
markets around the world. 
6 Conclusion 
We build a new cross-country dataset of harmonized rotating panel labor force surveys cov-
ering 42 countries with widely varying average income. We document three new empirical 
findings on how labor market dynamics vary with development. First, labor market flows 
(job-finding rates, employment-exit rates, and job-to-job transition rates) are two to three 
times higher in the poorest as compared to the richest countries. Second, employment 
hazards in poorer countries decline more sharply with tenure; much of their high turnover 
21While plausible, this relationship is not obvious. McKenzie and Paffhausen (2019) document that small-
firm exit rates are positively correlated with GDP per capita among poor and middle income countries, 
which implies that the extensive margin of firm employment volatility has the wrong sign with respect to 
development. Moreover, to the extent this is correlated with establishment size, we find little impact when 
fixing the size distribution. 
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can be attributed to high exit rates among workers with low tenure. Finally, wage-tenure 
profiles are much steeper in poorer countries. 
These facts can be rationalized by theories that feature endogenous separation and 
hence selection of which matches survive to long tenure spells. We use simple versions of 
two existing theories of this type to demonstrate how the selection mechanism works. These 
theories also suggest some candidate driving forces that may explain why selection works 
differently in poor versus rich countries. 
Finally, we use our data to empirically investigate driving forces. We disaggregate our 
results and find several interesting patterns, but none that account for more than one-
half of our basic facts. Likewise, labor market institutions correlate with our patterns, 
but controlling for them does not eliminate the correlation between development and labor 
market dynamics. Finally, we consider several alternative hypotheses that are more difficult 
to address with our data. We show several areas where additional survey questions or new 
types of data would be useful. 
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A Data Construction Details 
A.1 Data Sources 
We are aware of a large number of countries that have instituted a rotating panel labor 
force survey for at least some years (many countries switch between rotating and non-
rotating designs). All European Union countries have labor force surveys with such a design, 
organized and collected under the European Union Labour Force Survey. Additionally, 
at least 35 other countries have instituted a rotating panel labor force survey at some 
point. At least basic information for most countries’ labor force surveys can be found 
under the name given at the website of the International Labour Organization at https: 
//www.ilo.org/surveydata/index.php/home. 
We have been able to clarify with the national statistical agencies of most countries 
the conditions (if any) under which they will make available for research purposes the 
microdata with individual identifiers. Table A1 shows the samples included in our dataset. 
It lists for each country the name of the underlying dataset (with preference for the English 
name, if in common usage) and a brief description of how we acquired the data. Available 
online indicates that the data can be easily accessed online. In some cases they can simply 
be downloaded, but we also include countries that have a short and minimal registration 
or application process. Application required indicates that data can be accessed under 
somewhat stricter conditions. This typically includes submitting a formal application and 
research proposal to the relevant national statistical agency. It might also include assurances 
or plans to protect and not disseminate the data, or a fee. Personal correspondence indicates 
that the data were acquired through direct communication with the national statistical 
office. 
The European Union Labour Force Survey is a complicated case. Eurostat does not 
make available to researchers the data with longitudinal identifiers. However, roughly half 
of EU countries use consistent household and person identifiers within each year, which 
makes it possible to match people over time within a calendar year.22 For France and the 
United Kingdom, we are also able to access microdata with longitudinal identifiers directly 
from the national statistical office (via Que´telet PROGEDO Diffusion and the Office for 
National Statistics, respectively). We use these data instead so that we can also match 
individuals across calendar years and because they include additional information about 
22We thank Nik Engbom for bringing this point to our attention. We were able to confirm that these 
identifiers are consistent for some countries with Eurostat. We determined which countries could be matched 
in this way through experimentation; the relevant countries have extremely high rates of agreement over 
time on age and sex, while others do not. 
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Table A1: Rotating Panel Labor Force Surveys – Included 
Country Namea How Acquiredb 
Albania Labour Force Survey Available online 
Argentina Encuesta de Hogares y Empleo Available online 
Bolivia Continuous Employment Survey Available online 
Brazil Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD)c Available online 
Chile National Employment Survey (ENE) Available online 
Costa Rica Continuous Employment Survey (ECE) Available online 
Croatia European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Cyprus European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Czech Republic European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Denmark European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Dominican Republic Mercado de Trabajo Encuesta Continua (ENCFT) Personal correspondence 
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo Available online 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Labour Force Sample Survey Application required 
Estonia European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
France Enquete Emploi en Continu Application required 
Georgia Monitoring of Household Survey Available online 
Greece Labour Force Survey Application required 
Guyana Labor Force Survey Available online 
Hungary European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Iceland European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
India Periodic Labor Force Surveys Available online 
Ireland European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Italy European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Latvia European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Lithuania European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Malta European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Available online 
Nicaragua Encuestas de Hogares Personal correspondence 
Palestine Labor Force Survey Application required 
Paraguay Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua Available online 
Peru Encuesta National de Hogares Available online 
Philippines Labour Force Survey Application required 
Poland European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Romania European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Slovak Republic European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Slovenia European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey Available online 
Spain Encuesta de Poblacion Activa Application required 
Sweden European Union Labour Force Survey Application required 
Switzerland Swiss Labour Force Survey Application required 
United Kingdom Labour Force Survey Available online 
United States Current Population Survey Available online 
a Name of dataset, in English if the national statistical office designates such a name. 
b Brief description of how data were acquired. See text for details. 
c Data for 2002–2011 come from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey (PME), which 
samples six urban areas in Brazil. Patterns of interest are similar to those from urban 
areas for more recent data so we keep both. 
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Table A2: Rotating Panel Labor Force Surveys – Excluded 
Country Namea Statusb 
Armenia Labour Force Survey Wrong rotation scheme 
Australia Labour Force Survey Restricted access 
Bangladesh Labour Force Survey Confidential 
Canada Labour Force Survey Restricted access 
Indonesia National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) Only alternating quarters released 
Israel Labour Force Survey Restricted access 
Japan Labour Force Survey Wrong rotation scheme 
Korea Economically Active Population Survey Restricted access 
New Zealand Household Labour Force Survey Confidential 
Nigeria Household Labour Force Survey No response 
Russia Labor Force Survey Wrong rotation scheme 
Saudi Arabia Labor Force Survey Confidential 
Taiwan Manpower Survey Wrong rotation scheme 
Thailand Labour Force Survey Restricted access 
Turkey Household Labour Force Survey Confidential 
a Name of dataset, in English if the national statistical office designates such a name. 
b Brief description of why data cannot be acquired or are not useful for our purposes. See text 
for details. 
certain variables of interest. In the European Labour Force Survey it is not possible to 
match data for Greece or Spain, but we acquired the data separately from the national 
statistical offices (Hellenic Statistical Authority [ELSTAT] and the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica [INE], respectively). 
A number of countries appear to have rotating panel labor force surveys that we cannot 
access or that are not useful for our research design. One prominent example is the remain-
ing countries in the European Union Labour Force Survey that randomize identifiers across 
quarters within a year. Table A2 gives the remaining countries we are aware of, again with 
the name of the survey and the reason why the data are not included. 
Restricted access indicates data that are available under one or more of three restrictive 
conditions: researchers have to be citizens/nationals of the country; they have to be affili-
ated with a university or research institute of the country; or they have to travel to a secure 
location in the country. Confidential indicates that data are not available to researchers, 
to the best of our knowledge. Wrong rotation scheme indicates that the workers can be 
matched at a different frequency, typically monthly or annually. Indonesia operates a quar-
terly rotating panel labor force survey but makes only semi-annual data available, which 
for our purposes is the same as the wrong rotation scheme. Finally, no response indicates 
that the country appears to collect the appropriate data, but we were unable to find the 
data or secure a response from the national statistical agency despite numerous attempts 
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to do so. 
A.2 Variable Availability 
Not all countries collect or share all requisite data. For example, the EU LFS does not 
include earnings (only earnings deciles), thus eliminating its use in some parts of the paper. 
The table below specifies which countries include which data. 
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Table A3: Variable Availability by Sample 
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Country Employment Status Age Education Gender JJ Flows Marginally Attached Sector Occupation Formality Establishment Size Tenure Earnings Hours Rural 
Albania x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Argentina x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bolivia x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Brazil x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Chile x x x x x x x x x x x 
Costa Rica x x x x x x x x x x x 
Croatia x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Cyprus x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Czech Republic x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Denmark x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Dominican Republic x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Ecuador x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Egypt, Arab Rep. x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Estonia x x x x x x x x x x x x 
France x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Georgia x x x x x x x x x x 
Greece x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Guyana x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Hungary x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Iceland x x x x x x x x x x x x 
India x x x x x x x x x x 
Ireland x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Italy x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Latvia x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Lithuania x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Malta x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Mexico x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Nicaragua x x x x x x x x x x 
Palestine x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Paraguay x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Peru x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Philippines x x x x x x x x x x 
Poland x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Romania x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Slovak Republic x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Slovenia x x x x x x x x x x x x 
South Africa x x x x x x x x x x x 
Spain x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Sweden x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Switzerland x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
United Kingdom x x x x x x x x x x x x 
United States x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
a x = variable included for at least one year. 
A.3 Longitudinal Weights 
All of our countries provide sample weights so that cross-sectional moments are represen-
tative of the population of interest (typically the labor force or the urban labor force). 
However, the provided weights are not sufficient when constructing longitudinal moments 
such as the job-finding rate. The underlying problem is what is called margin error in the 
literature, or the failure to match workers with complete information across periods. This 
failure could arise because of attrition, temporary absence from the sample, inability to 
create a unique match, or nonresponse to the relevant outcomes in either period. If we 
drop all such observations and use the cross-sectional weights, then we are assuming that 
these variables are missing at random, while substantial evidence suggests that attrition is 
correlated with labor market transitions (Abowd and Zellner, 1985; Bleakley et al., 1999; 
Fujita and Ramey, 2009). 
Multiple solutions to this problem have been proposed in the literature (see, for example, 
Bleakley et al. (1999) or Fujita and Ramey (2009)). We post-stratify our weights so that 
the population distribution is the same in the matched and unmatched samples along 
dimensions of interest. For example, if unemployed people are more likely to move to find 
work and drop out of the sample, then they will be underrepresented in the longitudinally 
matched sample. Post-stratification increases the weight of unemployed workers in the 
longitudinal sample so that the implied unemployment rate is the same in the longitudinally 
matched sample as in the cross section. 
An important question with post-stratification is which dimensions to use in re-weighting 
the data. Adding more dimensions and fitting joint distributions rather than marginal 
distributions allows for a better match of longitudinal and cross-sectional data and reduces 
concern about attrition bias. On the other hand, adding too many dimensions generates 
practical problems as cell sizes become small and the adjustments to the original weights 
become large. At the extreme, post-stratification breaks down in cases where the unmatched 
sample has observations in a cell but the matched sample does not. 
We focus on four dimensions that are available in all countries and are important for 
understanding labor force dynamics: labor force status (wage workers, self-employed, unem-
ployed, and inactive), age (in 10-year bins), gender, and education (Barro-Lee categories). 
Post-stratifying on labor force status is important for fitting cross-sectional moments such 
as the unemployment rate. After that, we focus on demographics and education because 
we find that they are observable factors that account for a lot of variation in labor force 
status and labor force flows. 
We cannot fit the full joint distribution of these characteristics. Our compromise is to 
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Table A4: Impact of Re-Weighting 
Country Weight Correlation Median Absolute Change 
Albania 0.997 0.038 
Argentina 0.998 0.031 
Bolivia 0.893 0.200 
Brazil 0.999 0.025 
Chile 0.999 0.027 
Costa Rica 0.998 0.037 
Croatia 0.919 0.018 
Cyprus 0.989 0.027 
Czech Republic 0.999 0.009 
Denmark 0.989 0.048 
Dominican Republic 0.999 0.011 
Ecuador 0.980 0.056 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.981 0.041 
Estonia 0.997 0.026 
France 0.998 0.026 
Georgia 0.999 0.013 
Greece 1.000 0.008 
Guyana 0.972 0.069 
Hungary 1.000 0.009 
Iceland 0.950 0.040 
India 1.000 0.004 
Ireland 0.989 0.032 
Italy 0.999 0.015 
Latvia 0.997 0.032 
Lithuania 0.998 0.022 
Malta 0.991 0.038 
Mexico 1.000 0.020 
Nicaragua 0.997 0.020 
Palestine 0.998 0.015 
Paraguay 0.990 0.040 
Peru 0.994 0.038 
Philippines 0.993 0.044 
Poland 0.924 0.016 
Romania 0.999 0.011 
Slovak Republic 0.997 0.010 
Slovenia 0.998 0.026 
South Africa 0.994 0.036 
Spain 0.997 0.031 
Sweden 0.998 0.027 
Switzerland 0.999 0.012 
United Kingdom 1.000 0.000 
United States 0.995 0.042 
Table notes: Weight correlation is the correlation between the original 
cross-sectional weights and post-stratified weights. Median absolute 
change is the median of the absolute log deviation between 
cross-sectional weights and post-stratified weights. 
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rake the weights so that the matched and unmatched samples for each country-year have 
the same density by education-labor force status cells and age-gender cells. We focus on 
these dimensions because they are available and comparable across all countries and because 
matching them is important for the overall results. In some cases, we have to aggregate 
categories slightly before raking. For example, the number of unemployed workers with 
tertiary education in poorer countries or primary education in rich countries can be quite 
small; in such cases, we merge educational categories. 
Figure A1: Labor Market Facts (Adjusted vs Raw Data) 
(a) Employment-to-Population Ratio (b) Unemployment Rate 
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(c) Employment-Exit Rate (d) Job-Finding Rate 
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Table A4 shows the impact of re-weighting by comparing the original and adjusted 
weights. The two are highly correlated for all countries. The median absolute deviation is 
generally small, on the order of 0–20 percent. Another way to make the same point is to use 
original versus longitudinal weights to construct key moments. Figure A1 reproduces some 
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of the main figures in the text but compares the raw versus adjusted data. Re-weighting 
has a visible effect on the unemployment rate (Figure A1b) but a negligible effect on the 
employment-to-population ratio or the implied flows. 
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A.4 Comparison of EU Microdata versus Reported Flows 
The EU directly reports flow data. Their reported flows differ from ours in several ways. 
First, they report flows among the population aged 15–74, while we cut off at 65 to remain 
consistent across various countries. Second, while the EU uses a similar raking procedure 
to adjust weights, it differs in that they use only age group, sex, and labor force status. We 
additionally include education.23 The figures below show how our data differ from theirs, 
in both stocks and flows. 
Figure A2: Stocks 
(a) Employed Population Share (b) Unemployment Rate 
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(c) Inactive Share of Non-Employed 
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Micro data Reported
23More details of the EU procedure are available online at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Labour market flow statistics in the EU. 
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Figure A3: Flows 
(a) Employed to Unemployed (b) Employed to Inactive 
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(c) Unemployed to Employed (d) Inactive to Employed 
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A.5 Urban-Rural 
Our baseline analysis focuses on urban labor markets because some of our datasets do not 
sample rural labor markets. In this appendix, we compare the patterns for urban and rural 
labor markets for the countries where we have data on both. 
Figure A4 plots against GDP per capita employment-exit rates and job-finding rates 
separately for rural and urban workers. Transition rates are similar for the two types of 
workers in the richest countries, but elsewhere rural workers have higher transition rates. 
Poorer countries also have higher rural population shares. Put together, these findings imply 
that the relationship between labor market flows and development is probably stronger than 
what we estimate using only urban workers. For this sample of countries, the estimated 
49 
Figure A4: Quarterly Transition Rates: Rural versus Urban Workers 
(a) Employment-Exit Rate (b) Job-Finding Rate 
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coefficient from a regression of flows on PPP GDP per capita is 36 percent higher for 
employment-exit rates in rural relative to urban areas and 34 percent higher for job-finding 
rates. 
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B Additional Results on Stocks and Flows 
B.1 Detailed Transition Rates 
Figure B1 plots against PPP GDP per capita the quarterly persistence of each of the four 
labor force statuses. Each status is more persistent in richer countries, on average. 
Figure B1: Quarterly Probability of Remaining in Same Status 
(a) Wage Work (b) Self-Employment 
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(c) Unemployment (d) Inactivity 
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Figure B2 shows the detailed transition rates between states. Estimated regression 
lines of transition rates against log GDP per capita are included in all figures. The trend 
is clearly negative for nine of the twelve transitions; the probability of transitioning from 
unemployment or inactivity to wage work is the important outlier in terms of increasing 
with respect to development. 
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Figure B2: Detailed Quarterly Transition Rates 
(a) From Wage Work (b) From Self-Employment 
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B.2 Alternative Aggregations of Labor Force Status 
Section 2 of the paper shows that unemployment, inactivity, and self-employment are less 
distinct in poorer countries, in the sense that there are smaller differences in job-finding 
or wage work-finding rates for workers with these statuses. Given this finding, there is no 
clear way to map job seekers in search models to the data. Our benchmark approach is 
to focus on transitions between employment and non-employment, pooling unemployment 
and inactivity. Here, we explore two plausible alternatives. 
First, in Figure B3, we consider the more traditional approach of focusing on movements 
between employment and unemployment, entirely disregarding the inactive. There is still 
a negative relationship between labor market flows and development. 
Figure B3: Labor Market Results: Excluding Inactivity 
(a) Employment-Exit Rate (b) Job-Finding Rate 
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We also consider a hybrid between the baseline and previous approach, where we focus 
on flows between employment and a broader measure of unemployment that includes the 
marginally attached inactive workers. We define people as marginally attached if they 
are inactive but their self-reported reason for not seeking work indicates that they are 
unable to find suitable work (wrong skills, too young or old, no work currently available, 
etc.). Those whose responses indicate that they are unable to work or uninterested in work 
(sick, disabled, in school, retired, caring for the household or family) are excluded from the 
analysis. We then study the employment-exit rate (to broadly defined unemployment) and 
the job-finding rate (from broadly defined unemployment). 
The results are shown in Figure B4. As with the other approaches, we find a negative 
relationship between labor market flows and development. That relationship is stronger for 
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Figure B4: Labor Market Results: Unemployed plus Marginally Attached 
(a) employment-exit rate (b) Job Finding Rate 
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the employment-exit rate than for the job-finding rate, again consistent with the previous 
checks. 
Finally, we have considered alternative approaches to the treatment of the self-employed, 
such as counting them as unemployed. Doing so has a large impact on cross-sectional 
moments such as the unemployment rate but maintains the negative relationship between 
labor market flows and development. Results are available upon request. 
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C Inclusion of Other Data 
As we note in the text, we are missing nearly all sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, 
we are unable to answer whether these same patterns hold when we include the poorest 
countries in the world. To attempt to study this question, we turned to the Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys (LSMS) released by the World Bank. These are cross-sectional sur-
veys, but some include labor market modules that include the length of employment (which, 
in principle, could be used to back out a job-finding rate) or the length of non-employment 
(for the employment-exit rate). Unfortunately, only a small set of the 121 surveys include 
the proper questions, and even when they do, most do not properly map to our measure 
of the job-finding rate or exit rate.24 However, four surveys include retrospective monthly 
panels of labor market indicators.25 They are Bulgaria-2007, Nigeria-2010, Nigeria-2012, 
and Tajikistan-2009. We include them below. 
Figure C1: Flows 
(a) Employment Exit (b) Job Finding Rate 
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Overall, the employment-exit rates (Figure C1a) seem to line up with our data. The 
job-finding rates (Figure C1b) are quite low, though the rationale for this result is difficult 
to come by. Feng et al. (2018) and Bick et al. (2018) highlight how including such countries 
24For example, the Ghanaian survey asks “How many years or months have you been doing this work, all 
together?” thus including the entire length of any E–U–E flows in the same occupation/job. This makes 
this question inconsistent with the definition of a job finding rate. The Serbian survey asks, “When did 
you cease to perform your last job?” but records only years, thus making it impossible to measure at the 
frequency desired an employment-exit rate. 
25We considered all country-surveys available on the LSMS website (121 surveys, available here: 
https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/lsms). These four had documented retrospective pan-
els. 
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may change the overall shape of cross-sectional labor market patterns. Given the extra 
cost in collecting (even short) panel data, however, labor force surveys are unfortunately 
unavailable in such countries. We view this as an important question for future work. 
D Additional Accounting Results 
This section provides results on the ability of labor market institutions and worker charac-
teristics to account for job-finding rates and job-to-job transition rates. 
D.1 Accounting for Job-Finding Rates 
Table D1 shows the accounting results for the job finding rate. As explained in the text, 
results are available only after controlling for worker characteristics, which account for a 
small share of job-finding rates. 
Table D1: Accounting for Job-Finding Rates 
Share Accounted for (%) 
Total Employment Wage Employment 
Age 0.288 -0.532 
Edu -0.005 0.122 
Sex -0.212 0.207 
Age + Edu + Sex -0.226 0.140 
Table notes: All figures capture the share of the JFR-development relationship 
accounted for by the characteristics given in the rows. The share accounted for 
is constructed as explained in the text. Columns give the corresponding figure 
for total employment or wage employment; n/a indicates that the figure cannot 
be computed. 
Table D2 shows how labor market institutions account for job finding rates. Column 
(1) shows the relationship between GDP per capita and the job-finding rate for years 
2014–2018 (the only years the regulation data is available). The remaining columns show 
that controlling for labor market institutions has little effect on the estimated relationship 
between job-finding rates and development. In fact, in many cases, the relationship becomes 
stronger, suggesting that labor market institutions confound the underlying relationship 
between job-finding rates and development. 
56 
Table D2: Job-Finding Rates and Labor Market Institutions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log GDP per capita -0.026** -0.027** -0.026** -0.024* -0.032*** -0.026** -0.031*** -0.012 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.024) 
Severace pay (weeks of salary) -0.001 
(0.006) 
Annual paid leave required (days of work) -0.021** 
(0.009) 
Existence of labor court -0.004 
(0.020) 
Legal to have fixed-term contracts for permanent work? -0.013 
(0.013) 
Min Wage/VA per worker 0.004 
(0.035) 
Probationary period (months) -0.000 
(0.000) 
1st principal component 0.010 
(0.008) 
Observations 139 139 139 87 139 110 129 51 
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.086 0.037 0.056 0.052 0.071 0.088 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sample Average 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.123 0.127 0.128 0.126 0.121 
Log GDP per capita (no institutions) -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.024* -0.026** -0.026** -0.030*** -0.031* 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) 
R-squared (no institutions) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.036 0.049 0.052 0.066 0.060 
Table notes: All regulations are taken from the World Bank Doing Business survey. Severance and annual paid 
leave are measured as inverse hyperbolic sines, to approximate a log specification while allowing zeros. The last 
two rows are the estimated coefficient and R2 of the regression of the JFR on log GDP per capita on whatever 
sample is used in that column. 
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D.2 Detailed Accounting Results: Gender 
Figure D1 provides detailed information on gender’s role in accounting for labor market 
flows. Figure D1a shows the employment share of women against GDP per capita. In 
poorer countries, women generally have a lower share of employment. Figure D1b plots 
the exit rate by gender against GDP per capita. In most countries, women are more likely 
to exit employment. However, given that the employment share of women is lower in 
poorer countries, this contributes negatively to understanding high overall labor market 
flows there. 
Figure D1: Accounting for Gender 
(a) Employment Share of Women (b) Exit Rate by Gender 
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D.3 Detailed Accounting Results: Age 
Figure D2 provides detailed information on the role of age in accounting for labor market 
flows. For visual clarity, we divide the population into three groups, young (16–29 years 
of age), middle aged (30–49 years) and old (50–65 years). Figures D2b and D2a show the 
exit rate and employment share by GDP per capita. Although there are large differences 
in transition rates by age category, the population shares do not differ enough by age to 
account for much of the estimated relationship between labor market flows and development. 
Figure D2: Accounting for Age 
(a) Employment Share by Age (b) Exit Rate by Age 
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D.4 Detailed Accounting Results: Occupations 
Figure D3 provides detailed information on the role of occupation in accounting for labor 
market flows. For visual clarity, we focus on the two extreme ends of the occupational 
distribution: managers (the most skilled category in ISCO) and elementary workers (the 
least skilled). There are clear differences in the employment shares of these occupations 
between poor and rich countries (Figure D3a) and large differences in exit rates (Figure 
D3b). Overall, occupation accounts for somewhat less of the overall picture than education, 
because the other occupations (ISCO one-digit groups 2–8) offer a less clear pattern than 
the extremes. 
Figure D3: Accounting for Occupation 
(a) Employment Share, Select Occupations (b) Exit Rate, Select Occupations 
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D.5 Detailed Accounting Results: Sectors 
Figure D4 breaks down exit and finding rates by broad non-agricultural sectors. Interest-
ingly, there is almost no difference in exit rates across these sectors, which echo the more 
detailed results in the main text. Figure D4a shows the share of employment in services 
and manufacturing. As expected, richer countries have more employment in services.26 
Figure D4: Accounting for Sectors 
(a) Employment Share by Sector (b) Exit Rate by Sector 
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26There is a small amount of agriculture even in urban areas here. The sampling unit is a dwelling, so 
some urban workers may still work in agriculture. 
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D.6 Detailed Accounting Results: Establishment Size 
Figure D5 breaks down exit rates and employment shares by establishment size. Chile 
explicitly asks about workers in the firm within the entire country, and we drop them from 
the analysis. As mentioned in the text, countries generally bin establishment size. We use 
the bin that maximizes sample size, which is a coarse decomposition of 1–10 workers and 11 
or more workers. Figure D5b shows that in all countries exit rates are higher for workers in 
small firms and lowest for workers in large firms. Figure D5a shows that poorer countries 
have more employment in small firms and less in large firms. 
Figure D5: Accounting for Establishment Size 
(a) Employment Share by Establishment Size (b) Exit Rate by Establishment Size 
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D.7 Detailed Accounting Results: Informality 
Figure D6 breaks down accounting results for formal and informal wage work. Figure D6b 
shows exit rates for formal and informal workers. Workers are much more likely to exit 
from informal work, although the gap is smaller in poorer countries. Figure D6a repeats the 
share of informal workers by country, which declines from one-half to none in rich countries 
(the latter, by assumption). 
Figure D6: Accounting for Informal Employment (Wage Work) 
(a) Employment Share, Informal Workers (b) Exit Rate by Formality 
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D.8 Additional Results on Tenure-Wage Profiles 
D.8.1 Varying Bins for Tenure 
In the main text, we provided results using as our baseline 0–6 months of tenure. Here, we 
provide robustness by varying the bins. We consider as our baseline 0–12 months of tenure 
and compute average wage growth for workers with 1–5 years of tenure and 5 or more years 
of tenure. 
Figure D7: Wage-Tenure Profiles with Occupational Controls 
(a) Wage Difference, 1–5 Years of Tenure (b) Wage Difference, 5+ Years of Tenure 
BOL BRA
CHEDOM
ECU
EGY
FRAGBRMEX
PER
PRY
USA
WBG
0
10
20
30
40
50
4000 8000 16000 32000 64000
GDP per capita
BOL
BRA
CHEDOM
ECU
EGY
FRAGBR
GRC
MEX
PER
PRY
USA
WBG
0
10
20
30
40
50
4000 8000 16000 32000 64000
GDP per capita
D.8.2 Including Occupational Controls 
Our baseline results control for education. Here, we also control for occupation and show 
that the results do not change. We consider various binnings of tenure to show the results 
are robust. The first two figures are compared with a baseline of 0–6 months of tenure (our 
baseline in the main text), while the bottom two panels are compared to a baseline of 0–12 
months of tenure. 
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Figure D8: Wage-Tenure Profiles with Occupational Controls 
(a) Wage Difference, 6–12 Months of Tenure (b) Wage Difference, 1–5 Years of Tenure 
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(c) Wage Difference, 1–5 Years of Tenure (d) Wage Difference, 5+ Years of Tenure 
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E Textbook Search and Matching Model 
Given that we have constructed the standard flows familiar from search theory, we consider 
whether the textbook version of this theory provides an obvious explanation for our pat-
terns. We use simplest version of the model from Pissarides (1985). This theory features 
endogenous match formation but exogenous match destruction, so we focus only on whether 
it can help us understand cross-country variation in the job-finding rate. 
The heart of the theory is the matching function m(n, v) that gives the number of 
matches formed in a period as a function of the number of non-employed people n and 
the number of vacancies v. Following standard practice, we assume that this matching 
function is Cobb-Douglas, m(n, v) = Mnηv1−η . The job-finding rate is then the share of 
non-employed people who find a job in each period, m(n, v)/n = Mθ1−η , where θ ≡ v/n 
is the market tightness (from the perspective of firms). The parameters M and η are 
exogenous. The model then has one margin to generate variation in the job-finding rate, 
which is through market tightness. 
All non-employed people are assumed to search for jobs, so variation in market tightness 
comes from the incentives of firms to post vacancies. The model is set in continuous time, 
with firms discounting future flows at rate r. Firms pay a flow cost κ to hold a vacancy 
open and receive flow payoff x−w from a filled position, where x is the value of output, and 
w is the equilibrium wage. This leads to two value functions for a filled job and a vacancy, 
J and V respectively: 
rJ = x − w + δ(V − J) (6) 
rV = −κ + Mθ−η(J − V ). (7) 
Firms can enter freely, meaning that the value of posting a vacancy in equilibrium is 
V = 0. This assumption makes it possible to re-arrange the value functions to yield an 
expression for the job finding rate:  (1−η)/η
x − w 
= M1/ηκ1−1/ηjob finding rate = Mθ1−η 
r + δ  (1−η)/η
1 − wˆ 
= M1/ηκˆ1−1/η= Mθ1−η . (8) 
r + δ 
Equation (8) follows after normalizing through by the flow value of output, with κˆ = κ/x 
and wˆ = w/x. It links firms’ willingness to post vacancies to match profitability, which 
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depends on wages (relative to output), discount rates, and separation rates. 
We explore whether these factors are systematically lower for poor countries, which 
could explain higher job-finding rates there. In Figure E1a we plot against PPP GDP per 
capita average wages divided by average GDP per worker, which is our proxy for x. There 
is no strong trend. The separation rate consists of the employment-exit rate plus the job-
to-job transition rate. We have documented that both of these flows are higher in poor 
countries, which tends to make matches less profitable there. Finally, we assume that firms 
discount future profits using the interest rate, consistent with standard arbitrage arguments. 
We plot the real interest rate from World Development Indicators against development in 
Figure E1b. Interest rates are higher in poor countries, which implies that firms should 
discount future profits at a higher rate and hence implies matches are less profitable, not 
27more. 
Figure E1: Components of Match Profitability 
(a) Wages/GDP per worker (b) Interest Rate (Percent) 
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Altogether, the textbook search and matching theory emphasizes the link between firms’ 
profitability and their willingness to post vacancies, which in turn varies the job-finding 
rate. Observable indicators suggest matches should be, if anything, less profitable in poor 
countries; through the lens of the model, this should lead to a lower job finding rate. Thus, 
the theory is left to appeal to unobservably lower vacancy posting costs κˆ or unobservably 
higher efficiency of the match technology M . 28 
27The exact series is FR.INR.RINR. To the extent that firms in poor countries may not have access to 
credit at these interest rates, they would discount future profits even more, strengthening the result. 
28Standard logic implies that κˆ should be falling with development if it represents physical resources 
(software for filtering resumes) or constant if it represents worker time (interviewing candidates) - not 
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rising, as would be required here (Bollard et al., 2016). Martellini and Menzio (2019) provide a theory 
where the efficiency of the match technology varies endogenously over time. 
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